IN THE MATTER TO DECLARE G.R. No. 150274
IN
CONTEMPT OF COURT HON.
SIMEON
A. DATUMANONG in the
latter’s
capacity as Secretary of the
Department
of Public Works and
Highways.
JIMMIE F. TEL-EQUEN, Present:
Petitioner,
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson),
Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.
Promulgated:
August 4, 2006
x
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YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Petitioner Jimmie F. Tel-Equen,
District Engineer of Mountain Province, DPWH Cordillera Administrative Region,
filed this present petition to cite the former Secretary Simeon A. Datumanong
of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) in contempt of court for
issuing Memorandum Order dated
The facts of the case are as follows:
The Ombudsman Task Force on Public
Works and Highways filed with the Office of the Ombudsman an administrative
complaint for dishonesty, falsification of official documents, grave
misconduct, gross neglect of duty, violation of office rules and regulations,
and conduct prejudicial to the service against petitioner Tel-Equen and several
others, relative to the anomalous payment of P553,900.00 of the bailey bridge
components owned by the government. The
case was docketed as OMB-ADM-0-91-0430.[1]
On March 28, 1994, the
Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman found
respondents guilty of dishonesty, falsification of public documents, misconduct
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and ordered their dismissal
from the service with accessory penalties pursuant to Section 23 of Rule XIV,
Book V of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987.[2]
After the
denial of the motions for reconsideration, three petitions were filed before this
Court which were consolidated and referred to the Court of Appeals in light of
the ruling in Fabian v. Desierto[3]
where appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
cases should be referred to the appellate court under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.[4]
On
Petitioner, together
with his two co-accused, appealed from the decision of the Court of Appeals
which was docketed as G.R. No. 144694.[6]
Meanwhile, while appeal was still pending,
Secretary Datumanong issued the assailed Memorandum Order,[7]
which reads:
MEMORANDUM TO:
Messrs:
JIMMIE F.
TEL-EQUEN
District
Engineer
RUDY P. ANTONIO
Chief,
Construction Section
All of Mountain
Province Engineering District
This Department
This is with reference to the Order
of the Ombudsman dated
The Order was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals (Eight Division) in its Decision (Annex “C”) promulgated on
Inasmuch as the Order dismissing you
from the service is not a subject of any injunction or restraining order from
the Supreme Court, the same is immediately executory. Wherefore, you are hereby ordered
DROPPED/DISMISSED from the service effective upon receipt hereof.
(Sgd.) SIMEON A. DATUMANONG
Secretary
Hence, the instant
petition to cite Secretary Datumanong in contempt of court.
Petitioner contends that in issuing the
Memorandum Order despite knowledge of the pendency of G.R. No. 144694,
Secretary Datumanong committed a contumacious act, a gross and blatant display
of abuse of discretion and an unlawful interference with the proceedings before
the Court, thereby directly or indirectly impeding, obstructing and degrading
the administration of justice, and pre-empting the Court’s sole right to make a
decision in accord with the evidence and law.[8]
Petition lacks
merit.
The power to declare a person in
contempt of court and in dealing with him accordingly is an inherent power
lodged in courts of justice, to be used as a means to protect and preserve the
dignity of the court, the solemnity of the proceedings therein, and the
administration of justice from callous misbehavior, offensive personalities,
and contumacious refusal to comply with court orders.[9] This contempt power, however plenary it may
seem, must be exercised judiciously and sparingly with utmost self-restraint
with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of
the dignity of the court, not for retaliation or vindication.[10] It should not be availed of unless necessary
in the interest of justice.[11]
After careful
consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, we find that the
issuance of the Memorandum Order by Secretary Datumanong was not a contumacious
conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the
administration of justice. A conduct, to
be contumacious, implies willfulness, bad faith or with deliberate intent to
cause injustice, which is not so in the case at bar. If it were otherwise, petitioner should have
been dismissed immediately after the Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the
Office of the Ombudsman rendered its decision on
At most, it may be considered only
an error of judgment or a result of confusion considering the different rules
regarding execution of decisions pending appeal.
Decisions of the Civil Service
Commission under the Administrative Code of 1987[12]
are immediately executory even pending appeal because the pertinent laws[13]
under which the decisions were rendered mandate them to be so.[14] Thus, “where the legislature has seen fit
to declare that the decision of the quasi-judicial agency is immediately final
and executory pending appeal, the law expressly so provides.”[15] Otherwise, execution of decisions takes place
only when they become final and executory, like decisions rendered by the
Office of the Ombudsman.
Thus, in Lapid v. Court of
Appeals,[16]
the Court held:
Petitioner
was administratively charged for misconduct under the provisions of R.A. 6770,
the Ombudsman Act of 1989. Section 27 of
the said Act provides as follows:
“Section
27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. – All provisionary orders of
the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory.
A
motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of
the Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written
notice and shall be entertained only on the following grounds:
x
x x x x x x x x
Findings
of fact of the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence
are conclusive. Any order, directive or
decision imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not
more than one month’s salary shall be final and unappealable.
In
all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a
petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice
of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration
in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.”
The
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman likewise contain a similar
provision. Section 7, Rule III of the
said Rules provides as follows:
“Sec.
7. Finality of Decision – where the respondent is absolved of the charge and in
case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand,
suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month
salary, the decision shall be final and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision shall become
final after the expiration of ten (10) days from receipt thereof by the
respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration or petition for certiorari,
shall have been filed by him as prescribed in Section 27 of R.A. 6770.”
It
is clear from the above provisions that the punishment imposed upon petitioner,
i.e. suspension without pay for one year, is not among those listed as
final and unappealable, hence, immediately executory. Section 27 states that all provisionary
orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory;
and that any order, directive or decision of the said Office imposing the
penalty of censure or reprimand or suspension of not more than one month’s
salary is final and unappealable. As such the legal maxim “inclusio[n] unius
est exclusio alterius”
finds application. The express mention
of the things included excludes those that are not included. The clear import
of these statements taken together is that all other decisions of the Office of
the Ombudsman which impose penalties that are not enumerated in the said Section
27 are not final, unappealable and immediately executory. An appeal timely
filed, such as the one filed in the instant case, will stay the immediate
implementation of the decision. This finds support in the Rules of
Procedure issued by the Ombudsman itself which states that “(I)n all other
cases, the decision shall become final after the expiration of ten (10) days
from receipt thereof by the respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration or
petition for certiorari (should now be petition for review under Rule 43) shall
have been filed by him as prescribed in Section 27 of R.A. 6770.”
x
x x x
A judgment becomes “final and executory” by operation of law. Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act provides that any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman imposing a penalty of public censure or reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month’s salary shall be final and unappealable. In all other cases, the respondent therein has the right to appeal to the Court of Appeals within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision. In all these other cases therefore, the judgment imposed therein will become final after the lapse of the reglementary period of appeal if no appeal is perfected or, an appeal therefrom having been taken, the judgment in the appellate tribunal becomes final. It is this final judgment which is then correctly categorized as a “final and executory judgment” in respect to which execution shall issue as a matter of right. In other words, the fact that the Ombudsman Act gives parties the right to appeal from its decisions should generally carry with it the stay of these decisions pending appeal. Otherwise, the essential nature of these judgments as being appealable would be rendered nugatory. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner was charged
administratively before the Office of the Ombudsman. Accordingly, the provisions of the Ombudsman
Act and its Rules of Procedure should apply in his case. It is a principle in statutory construction
that where there are two statutes that apply to a particular case, that which
was specially designed for the said case must prevail over the other.[17]
In fine, Secretary Datumanong
cannot be held in contempt of court for issuing the Memorandum Order in the
absence of malice or wrongful conduct in issuing it. The remedy of the petitioner is not to file a
petition to cite him in contempt of court but to elevate the error to the
higher court for review and correction.
However,
two events supervened since the filing of this petition that would support its
dismissal. First, on
Rule III
PROCEDURE IN
ADMINISTRATIVE CASES
Section 7. Finality and execution of
decision. - Where the respondent is absolved of the charge,
and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one
month salary, the decision shall be final, executory and unappealable. In all other
cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals on a verified
petition for review under the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43
of the Rules of Court, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the written
Notice of the Decision or Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
An appeal shall not stop the
decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension or removal and
the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under
preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments
that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal.
A decision of
the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a
matter of course. The Office of the Ombudsman shall ensure that the decision
shall be strictly enforced and properly implemented. The refusal or failure by
any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Office of the
Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, or censure shall be a ground for
disciplinary action against said officer.
Well-settled
is the rule that procedural laws are construed to be applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, and are deemed
retroactive in that sense and to that extent. As a general rule, the
retroactive application of procedural laws cannot be considered violative of
any personal rights because no vested right may attach to nor arise therefrom.[19]
In the case
at bar, the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman are clearly
procedural and no vested right of the petitioner is violated as he is
considered preventively suspended while his case is on appeal. Moreover, in the event he wins on appeal, he
shall be paid the salary and such
other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or
removal. Besides, there is no such thing
as a vested interest in an office, or even an absolute right to hold
office. Excepting constitutional offices
which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be
said to have any vested right in an office.[20]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition to cite former
Secretary Simeon A. Datumanong of the Department of Public Works and Highways in
contempt of court for issuing Memorandum Order dated
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Antonio v. Villa, G.R. No. 144694, March 28,
2005, 454 SCRA 84, 91.
[2]
[3]
356 Phil. 787, 808 (1998).
[4] Antonio
v. Villa, supra at 96.
[5]
[6]
[7] Rollo, p. 12.
[8]
[9] Office
of the Court Administrator v. Paderanga, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1660, August 25, 2005, 468 SCRA 21,
34.
[10] Rodriguez v. Bonifacio, 398 Phil. 441, 468 (2000).
[11] Quinio
v. Court of Appeals, 390 Phil. 852, 861 (2000).
[12]
Section 47(4), Chapter 6, Title I of Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (1987),
reads:
Sec. 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. –
x x x x
(4) An appeal shall not stop the decision
from being executory, and in case the penalty is suspension or removal, the
respondent shall be considered as having been under the preventive suspension
during the pendency of the appeal in the event he wins an appeal.
[13]
Section 37(d) of Article IX of P.D. No. 807 (1975), otherwise known as Civil
Service Decree of the Philippines, reads:
Sec. 37. Disciplinary
Jurisdiction. –
x x x x
(d) An appeal shall not stop the decision
from being executory, and in case the penalty is suspension or removal, the
respondent shall be considered as having been under the preventive suspension
during the pendency of the appeal in the event he wins an appeal.
And, Section 47 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19-99,
otherwise known as the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service (1999), reads:
Section
47. Effect of Filing. - An appeal
shall not stop the decision from being executory, and in case the penalty is
suspension or removal, the respondent shall be considered as having been under
preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal, in the event he wins
an appeal.
[14] Lapid
v. Court of Appeals, 390 Phil. 236, 251 (2000).
[15] Neeland
v. Villanueva, Jr., 416 Phil. 580, 592 (2001).
[16] Supra at 246-247, 249.
[17]
[18] Signed
by Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo on
[19] Calacala
v. Republic, G.R. No. 154415,
[20] Sangguniang
Bayan of San Andres, Catanduanes v. Court of Appeals, 348 Phil. 303, 321
(1998).